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December 20, 2006

Xinjiang 2021

At the behest of neweurasia, I'm diving today into the unfamiliar waters of wild speculation. What will Xinjiang be like fifteen years from now, in the year 2021? Of course, no one really knows. If my predictions turn out to be correct, chalk it up to luck rather than extraordinary foresight. Still, I hope you'll enjoy this exercise in imagination: a blog entry from December 20, 2021 sent by my future self to my present self via QQQ — the bloated successor to QQ — which evidently has a time-travel email feature.

December 20, 2021

In 2021, energy needs and security concerns have focused Beijing on Xinjiang and the restive lands in Central Asia to the west. With Taiwan on a firm path towards integration and Tibet little more than an expensive tourist playground, the situation in Xinjiang remains one last painful thorn in the side of the central government. The events of this past year clearly illustrate that Xinjiang remains of paramount importance in terms of China's both domestic and foreign policies.

Xinjiang, circa 2021.

Background Information
When the Xinjiang Production & Construction Corps (XPCC) were disbanded in 2014, experts expected privitization of the agriculture sector to bring about a higher standard of living for the region's migrant worker and ethnic minority populations. The hope was that the elimination of an unfair government advantage would result in an even playing field for the region's small farmers, as well as market-driven wage increases. While a few land-owning minorities did in fact benefit from the privitization scheme, the overall result was the loss of tens of thousands of farm-related jobs. Unexpectedly, former XPCC brigade leaders established partnerships with multinational agri-conglomerates, mechanizing and automating existing large farms while simultaneously buying and combining small farms throughout the region.

Coming at a time when both the regional and central governments were emphasising the extraction of energy resources over agriculture, the loss of the XPCC was the final step in Xinjiang's march towards ethnic segregation and urbanization. Unable to find jobs in either the oil industry or Han-owned factories near Urumqi, young Uyghurs began migrating en masse towards cities along the southern Silk Road, especially the area between Kashgar and Hotan where they formed a solid ethnic majority. Many of the Han workers crammed into the Urumqi Special Economic Zone (USEZ), where factories producing goods for Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East are encouraged by government subsidies and extensive rail links; others headed for Xinjiang's new capital city, Korla, where the completion of the gargantuan 3,000 km GUSAC (Gulf South Asia China) oil pipeline from Qatar via Pakistan — not to mention the Siberian pipeline via Altay — gave rise to the city's nickname, "Gobi Houston".

Between 2006 and 2021, the population of Korla increased from 400 thousand to 2.6 million, while the former capital of Urumqi increased from 2.4 million to more than 5 million. All other regions of Xinjiang except for Kashgar and Hotan prefectures in the south lost population, as rural life in northern Xinjiang quickly faded away.

One of the most significant unintended consequences of the ethnic concentration of displaced Uyghurs in southwest Xinjiang was the resurgence of seperatist sentiment and activity, which had been relatively dormant since a harsh government crackdown in the late 1990s. Beijing ignored initial protests in Hotan during the spring of 2018, only to send in troops that summer when evidence surfaced that Islamic extremists from Pakistan were actively infiltrating the Uyghur population and fomenting unrest. On September 11, 2018, an anti-government protest in Kargilik was violently supressed, resulting in between 7 and 26 deaths. On January 1, 2019, public gatherings of more than eight people were banned in Hotan, Kashgar, and Kizilsu prefectures, effectively outlawing Muslim prayer services and mosque attendance. Needless to say, this step was effective at quieting local protests while enraging the entire Muslim world.

2021: China's War on Terror
With a heavy presence of PLA troops on the streets of Hotan and Kashgar and public gatherings impossible, Uyghur seperatist elements went deep underground in 2019. Occasional raids turned up small groups of anti-government rebels in September 2019 and May 2020, with several public executions being held as a warning to the Uyghur population. While the situation was tense, a "hot conflict" similar to the continued fighting in the West Bank and Gaza had not yet erupted.

But when a bomb planted by the Pan-Islamic Turkestan Association (PITA) ripped a hole in the GUSAC pipeline west of Tashkurgan on February 12th of this year, things heated up considerably. Faced with a two week interruption of their most important crude oil supply, Beijing sent additional troops to Xinjiang to protect the pipeline and seek out the perpetrators. A second attack on the pipeline — this time on the Pakistani-controlled Kashmir side of the border — resulted in a declaration by Beijing that al-Qaeda was "now clearly attacking China directly" using both hardened extremists in Pakistan and new recruits among the Uyghur population.

The attacks came as no surprise to experts in the West, who had been predicting since the US withdrawals from Iraq in 2015 and Afghanistan in 2018 that Islamic extremism would now turn its fury against the rising superpower of China. An influential 2019 article in Foreign Policy written by Dr. Condoleezza Rice argued that "with a long, porous border in Central Asia and a history of repressing its Muslim population, China now represents an almost irresistible target to the forces of extreme Islam."

With all of northern Pakistan controlled by Taliban forces, Beijing in May forced the signing of a pact establishing a Chinese "zone of military control" (ZMC) in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Ostensibly invited by the Pakistani government in Islamabad, the first Chinese occupation troops crossed the border using the Karakoram Highway on May 29th.

On June 26th, PLA border troops in Xinjiang intercepted a shipment of nearly 800 kg of heroin coming over the Wakhjir Pass from Afghanistan. This represented the largest drug confiscation in modern Chinese history, and was also a significant development in China's own War on Terror. Announcing the bust, Chinese authorities stated that they had unequivocal evidence that funds from the sale of illegal drugs were being used to finance Uyghur resistance groups, and that all Taliban forces worldwide were now legitimate targets for the PLA. Only a week later, citing the Afghan and Tajik governments' de facto abandonment of their easternmost territories to Taliban forces, the Chinese unilaterally extended the ZMC to include those areas.

Since the establishment of the ZMC six months ago, China has been fighting a low-intensity defensive war, attempting to avoid mistakes made by the US during their two decade occupation of the region. Whereas the US actively patrolled and sought out terrorist elements during their campaign, the Chinese military has so far been content to simply protect the integrity of the GUSAC pipeline and China's far-western border.

If recent history is any indication — China being the third country to occupy Afghanistan, if only partially, in the past fifty years — the PLA has a long, tough fight ahead. Common sense indicates that extremists in the Muslim world are only concentrating their resources and organizing forces for another jihad against what are already being called in Arabic kafir asfar, or yellow infidels.

This entry is cross-posted over at neweurasia along with articles from other bloggers across Central Asia writing on the same topic: what will the country you live in be like in 15 years? The other posts can be found here. True, Xinjiang is not a country, but they decided to include me anyway.

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posted December 20, 2006 at 12:15 PM unofficial Xinjiang time | Comments (40)

December 17, 2006

Meeting Your Imagines!

I don't know how I managed to omit mentioning this story last month, but I'd better get it out of the way before 2006 comes to a close...

You may remember a post this summer featuring a video preview of a CCTV documentary on Korla. Well, it turns out that the documentary was Korla's entry into the CCTV 2006 Top Ten Charming Cities of China (中国十佳魅力城市) competition... and guess what? Korla won! [Insert applause, cat calls, loud whistling, and Arsenio Hall-style hooting here.]

Well, actually there were ten winners announced last month, not just one... but Korla was the sole champion in the "Northwest China" category. Take that all you much crappier cities spread across the vast reaches of Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Tibet!

This is the perfect moment, then, to reveal a panorama image I shot of Korla's downtown a couple of months ago:

Panoramic photo of Korla, Xinjiang.

Click on the small image for a much higher resolution version. In this photo you can see (from L to R) the southernmost foothills of the Tian Shan mountains, the Bazhou Prefecture (巴音郭楞蒙古自治州) government headquarters building, People's Park, the Loulan Hotel, and the Kongque River (孔雀河). You can also see that beyond the very clean and tidy city limits lies only the emptiness of the desert. Not a bad place to live, if I say so myself. (Click here for the Internet's largest gallery of photos from Korla, Xinjiang.)

This is Korla's official blurb on the subject, with Chinglish phrasing left intact:

A most attractive city: This is a famous city in Western China, meeting your imagines of western region, such as desert, lakes and grassland as well as enticing golden poplar, but not limited to the imagines, as here the people are modern, the roads are modern, and the cities are more modern. Korla City of Xinjiang, perfect combination of western flavors and contemporary fashions.

Interestingly, that last sentence is written in Chinese as, "西域风情与当代风尚的完美融合, 新疆库尔勒市." Thus, Chinese readers will understand that Korla features "Turkic" or "Central Asian" flavor, while foreigners are misled to believe that the city is full of "Western" flavor, like a delicious hamburger.

Mmmm... juicy, charbroiled, medium-rare hamburgers with grilled onions on top. Beijing T.G.I. Friday's, here I come!

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posted December 17, 2006 at 09:45 AM unofficial Xinjiang time | Comments (21)

December 16, 2006

Holiday in Manchuria

Happy Holidays 2006!I'll be heading to Beijing next week to meet up with an old friend for some winter holiday travel. After the mandatory tour of the capital we're planning to visit Harbin for the Ice Festival, among other attractions up in Manchuria. It should be... well, cold. (Alright, f$&#ing sub-freezing.) As I write, the temperature in Harbin is -19°C/-4°F! While my friend plans to protect his body with the most hi-tech long underwear known to man, I'll have to do with layers of Xinjiang's most advanced fabric: cashmere from the local sheep. Wish me luck.

Anyway, I'm hoping that before I lose my ears and toes to hypothermia up north I'll be able to participate in some sort of boisterous Christmas Eve shindig in Beijing. Anybody out there want to suggest something fun to do... or invite me and my friend to a happenin' party? Any inside tips for winter travel destinations in Dongbei would also be appreciated.

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posted December 16, 2006 at 07:58 PM unofficial Xinjiang time | Comments (14)

December 15, 2006

China-Pakistan Military Excercises

Chinese and Pakistani troops start anti-terror exercise

From Agence France Presse:

Two guns boomed to herald the start of the exercise and paragliders showered fresh rose petals over the parade ground, before soldiers took part in a folk dancing display.

The Chinese contingent flew in to the garrison city of Rawalpindi near the capital Islamabad on Sunday to take part in the 10-day exercise dubbed "Friendship 2006"....

Beijing remains Islamabad's largest arms supplier and the two are jointly developing the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet. China is also providing major industrial and economic assistance.

Islamabad meanwhile is helping Beijing deal with the perceived threat of Muslim separatists in China's western Xinjiang region, which borders Kazakhstan and Pakistan.

In late 2003 Pakistan said it had killed Hasan Mahsum, identified by China as its "top terrorist", in a raid in Pakistan's South Waziristan tribal region.

Isn't friendship a wonderful thing? And don't let that sly usage of "perceived" go by without a knowing wink to the anonymous author.

For a brief bio/obituary of Hasan Mahsum (aka Abu-Muhammad al-Turkestani) written by the Chinese government, click here. Very few of you will probably remember that Mahsum was killed in what was at the time (and still may be) Pakistan's "largest-ever offensive against al-Qaida", in the lawless region of Waziristan.

You can read the full AFP article (that is, the boring bits in the middle I chopped out) below. Heck, I'll even throw in some old articles from Asharq Alawsat and Dow Jones for those of you who like to be well-informed.

Chinese and Pakistani troops start anti-terror exercise
11 December 2006
Agence France Presse

ABBOTABAD, Pakistan, Dec 11, 2006 (AFP) -

More than 200 Chinese troops headed to Pakistan's mountainous northern region on Monday at the start of the first ever joint military exercise held here by the two allies.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers and their Pakistani counterparts raised flags and played their national anthems at a special ceremony in the hill station of Abbotabad, an AFP photographer said.

Two guns boomed to herald the start of the exercise and paragliders showered fresh rose petals over the parade ground, before soldiers took part in a folk dancing display.

The Chinese contingent flew in to the garrison city of Rawalpindi near the capital Islamabad on Sunday to take part in the 10-day exercise dubbed "Friendship 2006".

PLA Major General Liu Minjiang said at the ceremony that the exercises would foster "a joint strategy and tactics to fight terrorism." Pakistani Major General Mohsin Kamal said the manoeuvres would strengthen cooperation.

The exercise comes around two weeks after Chinese President Hu Jintao pledged to take strategic ties with Pakistan to a "new level" during his first ever visit to the South Asian country.

"This is the first time that a PLA contingent has arrived in Pakistan" on an exercise, a senior Pakistani military official said, adding that Pakistani troops visited China for joint exercises in 2004.

"The exercise is a display of the mutual commitment and resolve to fight terrorism, besides bolstering time-tested friendship between the two countries," the official said on condition of anonymity.

After the ceremony in Abbotabad the soldiers were due to head to the mountains further north for the exercises, the official said.

Beijing remains Islamabad's largest arms supplier and the two are jointly developing the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet. China is also providing major industrial and economic assistance.

Islamabad meanwhile is helping Beijing deal with the perceived threat of Muslim separatists in China's western Xinjiang region, which borders Kazakhstan and Pakistan.

In late 2003 Pakistan said it had killed Hasan Mahsum, identified by China as its "top terrorist", in a raid in Pakistan's South Waziristan tribal region.

UK-based group confirms death of East Turkestan leader in Pakistan
26 December 2003
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific

Text of report by Muhammad al-Shafi'i entitled: "Fundamentalist group announces killing of Al-Qa'idah leader, who is leader of Eastern Turkestanis, in Pakistan", published by London-based newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat web site on 25 December

A fundamentalist group in London has announced the killing of [Al-Qa'idah] leader Hasan Mahsum, nicknamed Abu-Muhammad al-Turkestani, 39, on Pakistani soil. It said he was killed in an attack carried out by US forces, in cooperation with members of the Pakistani intelligence, in the strip along the border with Afghanistan.

Chinese authorities consider Hasan Mahsum as one of the most dangerous terrorists who fight the Chinese presence in East Turkestan. Chinese authorities had put the name of Abu-Muhammad al-Turkestani on a list that includes 11 fundamentalists wanted by the authorities for having links to Al-Qa'idah organization, led by Usamah Bin-Ladin. Last year, the United States added the "East Turkestan Movement" to the list of terrorist organizations.

Yasir al-Sirri, director of the Islamic Observation Centre, a London-based human rights organization concerned with news about fundamentalists worldwide, quoted informed Pakistani sources as saying that Hasan Mahsum was killed while he was touring the border strip between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mahsum is the leader of East Turkestan Movement, which seeks independence from China.

Shaukat Sultan, spokesman of the Pakistani Army, said DNA tests will be conducted on the body of Abu-Muhammad al-Turkestani later. A news report, transmitted by the Islamic Observation Centre about the battles in Afghanistan yesterday, carried Sultan's statements, which were also published by the Pakistani newspaper Jang yesterday. In his statements, Sultan announced that the Pakistani army killed Abu-Muhammad al-Turkestani, "leader of the Turkestanis who are opposed to China" in (Ingur Iddah) south of the Pakistani city of Waziristan in the 2 October 2003 battles.

Eight members of Al-Qa'idah organization, including Al-Qa'idah leader Abu-Abd-al-Rahman al-Kindi, were killed in the same battle. Al-Kindi, whose [real] name is Ahmad Sa'id Khadr, was previously accused of involvement in blowing up the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in 1995.

The name of Abu-Muhammad al-Turkestani was associated with a campaign of bombings in Xinjiang in East Turkestan in 1995 before he fled China for Afghanistan in 1997. Eighteen other Arab, Uzbek, Turkestani, and Afghan members of Al-Qa'idah were arrested in the raids conducted by the Pakistani army in October 2003. US sources say Abu-Abd-al-Rahman al-Kindi, who is believed to be in his fifties, used to run an international organization for humanitarian affairs, which has reportedly sent funds to training camps for Al-Qa'idah in Afghanistan.

Source: Al-Sharq al-Awsat web site, London, in Arabic 25 Dec 03

Pakistan Army Kills 12 In Offensive Against Al-Qaida
2 October 2003
Dow Jones International News

ANGORE ADDA, Pakistan (AP)--Pakistan's army launched its largest-ever offensive against al-Qaida and other militants in a rugged tribal region bordering Afghanistan on Thursday, killing at least 12 suspects and arresting 10, military officials said.

An Associated Press reporter at the scene saw four bodies and Maj. Gen. Ameer Faisal, the commander of the operation, said eight others were lying in an area about 100 meters (yards) away that was too dangerous to enter. Ten al-Qaida suspects, blindfolded and with their hands tied behind their backs, were led away from the area.

Faisal said the majority of those killed and captured in the operation in South Waziristan appeared to be foreigners. It was not immediately clear if any top-ranking al-Qaida operatives were among them. Osama bin Laden and his alleged number two, Ayman al-Zawahri, are believed to be hiding somewhere along the long border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Taliban fighters are also believed to use the area as a staging ground to launch attacks inside Afghanistan. On Monday, a U.S. soldier was killed in a gunbattle with anti-coalition forces near a base at Shkin, a town in Afghanistan's Paktika province, just across the border from South Waziristan. The base and several others along the border come under frequent attack.

At least two Pakistani troops were wounded in Thursday's operation, Faisal said, and the battle was ongoing. Some 200 Pakistani troops reportedly took part, and Gen. Shaukat Sultan, an army spokesman, said it was the army's largest-ever offensive against al-Qaida, and the largest army operation to date in the fiercely autonomous tribal areas.

The operation came on the same day that Pakistan announced that two top U.S. envoys had postponed a visit to Islamabad for "scheduling reasons."

The fighting began in South Waziristan at about 5:30 a.m., shortly after early morning prayers, Faisal said. He said the two injured soldiers were hurt when the suspects lobbed grenades at them as they first approached the hideout.

At least nine hours later, gunfire could be heard coming from a group of compounds where Faisal said other al-Qaida suspects had taken refuge. At least four Pakistani helicopters circled the area.

"Al-Qaida people have taken refuge in these five big compounds. We do not know how many people are hiding there," Faisal told the AP. He said hand grenades, AK-47 assault rifles, anti-tank mines, audio cassettes and other documents were seized during the operation.

Army helicopters and soldiers were organizing the operation from a base camp at Angore Adda, just a kilometer (half mile) from the fighting, and the last Pakistani town before the border with Afghanistan. The army brought several journalists to the camp by helicopter to observe the operation, then took them to the fighting area.

It was the first time the army has allowed journalists to witness an ongoing operation against al-Qaida suspects. The journalists were taken away from the fighting area with the battle still raging.

The troops moved into South Waziristan early Thursday after receiving word that al-Qaida operatives had sneaked into the area from Afghanistan, the army said in a statement.

"The operation commenced early this morning and is progressing smoothly," it said.

The areas of North and South Waziristan, both in Pakistan's ultra-conservative North West Frontier Province, are home to Pashtun tribesmen who have for centuries maintained a fierce independence and who share the Taliban's strict interpretation of Islam.

Maulana Fazl-ur Rahman, a pro-Taliban politician in Islamabad, condemned the operation.

"This operation is not in the interest of the nation. Al-Qaida may be against America, but they are certainly not against Pakistan and Muslims," he said. "This operation will give a negative impression about Pakistan in the Arab world."

Sultan, the army spokesman, told AP that the "operation is part of Pakistan's effort at combating terrorism."

The army said no foreign troops took part in the operation. Residents in the tribal areas have reported seeing U.S. special forces operatives in the past, but the presence of American forces has always been denied by Islamabad and Afghanistan.

The fighting came on the same day that U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca had been due to arrive in Pakistan for talks on the war on terrorism, but Pakistan's Foreign Ministry announced the visit had been postponed for "scheduling reasons." Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali is in the United States to meet with senior U.S. officials.

Several high-profile al-Qaida arrests in Pakistan have coincided with major international diplomatic events.

Exactly a year after Sept. 11, 2001, a suspected planner of the attacks, Ramzi Binalshibh, was captured in the southern city of Karachi. In June - three days after President Gen. Pervez Musharraf met U.S. President George W. Bush in the United States - another al-Qaida operative was arrested and a video cassette seized that purportedly showed bin Laden warning of attacks against U.S. interests.

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posted December 15, 2006 at 05:13 AM unofficial Xinjiang time | Comments (28)

December 14, 2006

Visitor to Ice Mountain (冰山上的来客)

冰山上的来客I try to keep the content here fresh and unique. So, when I became aware during a drunken karaoke session last week of the classic 1963 Chinese film 冰山上的来客 (aka Visitor to Ice Mountain), I knew I had to get ahold of it for you. Various video shops said it couldn't be had, but after a long search I managed to track down an excellent quality version on VCD. With a bit of editing I've managed to string together a few of the best clips from the film... and by best I mean those that depict ethnic life in Xinjiang during the early days of the People's Republic.

You don't need to know much to enjoy the following sequence, but I'll fill you in on the basic plot. The central character, Amir — a young idealistic PLA soldier who also happens to be a Tajik — loses his childhood love to backwards feudalistic marriage practices. After many years of searching he tracks down his love, causing much friction with the residents of Ice Mountain, some of whom already are wary of the Red Army. Dancing, sinister glances, hand-to-hand combat, and sheep carcass polo ensue:

Now, the haberdashery experts out there will point out that that the hats worn by the men in the film are not only Tajik, but also Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uyghur. There are three explanations for this observation: a) the film-makers of the time were trying to promote the idea that China's minority groups live together in harmony; b) Tajiks can wear whatever damn hats they please, thank you very much; and c) the casting director asked the actors he rounded up for the Tajik roles — but who in reality were mostly Uyghurs and other minorities — to bring their own hats to the set.

While the film does feature its own brand of pro-PRC propaganda, I was suprised by the level of tensions depicted between the PLA and local Xinjiang residents. Sure, the Tajiks are shown as conspiratorial yokels saved from themselves by forward-thinking Communists, but could you imagine a Chinese film being made today where soldiers battle it out with separatist Uyghurs? I can't.

Does anyone out there have other suggestions for the translated name of this film? CnMDb says Visitors on the Icy Mountain while dianying.com goes way out there with Guests on an Iceberg. Choosing my title, I was split fifty-fifty about the addition of an "s", but chose in the end to go with the singular Visitor to Ice Mountain. Something else that's unclear is whether Ice Mountain is only a reference to the general setting or if that's also the name of the Tajik village... I suppose some of the answers might be clearer if I watched the recent but much-maligned 冰山上的来客 television series.

By the way, those Chinese subtitles that appear occasionally are the lyrics to the songs being sung in the background, not what's being said by the characters on-screen.

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posted December 14, 2006 at 11:24 AM unofficial Xinjiang time | Comments (28)

December 10, 2006

Caption Contest #1

DECEMBER 17 MIDNIGHT UPDATE: And the winner is...

"Although China is famous for water-torture, the little known watermelon-torture should also be mentioned." [Meg @ Violet Eclipse]

Runner-up:
"Just think of what I could do with a banana." [Dave F.]

The picture was taken at Bosten Lake's White Egret Beach this past summer. I buried some random Chinese girl in the sand and things got... well, out of hand.

**************************

This blog could always use a bit more humor, and as I'm too lazy to make the effort myself I've decided to employ you — loyal readers and uninformed passers-by — to do the work for me. So, in what I hope will become a monthly feature, let me present to you the mildly humorous source material for The Opposite End of China's Inaugural Caption Contest:

Caption Contest Photo #1

I'll pick a winner and a runner-up in a week... let's say, after midnight Beijing time on December 17th? I'll also reveal the circumstances under which the photo was taken. I can't promise any sort of prize at the moment, but I'll try to figure something out.

And no complaints, please. If you think this is corny, just wait until next summer when I plan to start holding online ice cream socials and sack races!

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posted December 10, 2006 at 12:00 AM unofficial Xinjiang time | Comments (34)

December 08, 2006

Minority Culture vs. Majority Language

Ethnically Kyrgyz schoolgirls living in a small village along the road between China and Pakistan, outside their small schoolhouse.

An interesting Reuters article published Wednesday discusses the conflict in China between teaching the majority language (Mandarin Chinese) and preserving local minority cultures. The article takes a fairly unbiased point-of-view when you look at it on paper, but still somehow manages to paint the feeling that the Chinese government is up to no good:

Wearing an NBA sweatshirt and a Mickey Mouse cap, 13-year-old Mingbayi Abdubaki plays beside the mountainous highway to Pakistan with a battery-powered earth digger he built himself from scrap.

The Chinese teenager hopes to design real machines when he grows up, but if you believe his headmaster, he cannot understand a word of classes at his state-funded school.

Ethnically Kyrgyz, he speaks barely enough Chinese to stammer out his name and age. But under a campaign to make the language of Beijing the language of education nationwide, he is supposed to be studying only in Mandarin.

I'm not sure how the author manages to capture this somehow simultaneously neutral yet anti-government tone, but like Stephen Colbert I'm here to feel the news at you... so don't expect me to explain myself with supporting "facts".

This is one situation where I'm completely (or at least mostly) in agreement with Beijing's policies. Here in Xinjiang, meeting people who can't speak Chinese is a daily occurence, and it's hard to imagine how they manage to live at such detachment from the world around them. And we're not talking about people who were born in another country... these are native-born Chinese citizens, despite their distinct and seperate ethnic identity.

Can you imagine a serious debate in the US where we would even consider the need for Mexicans in San Diego, Chinese in San Francisco, Cubans in Miami, and Scandinavians in Minnesota to be taught primarily in their native language in order to preserve their culture? Sure, you may say that there are plenty of Hispanics in the US who speak only Spanish, but how many of them were born in the country? And while Hispanics make up 15% or so of the US population, Uyghurs constitute less than 1% of the Chinese population with Kyrgyz residents far lower in number.

Critics of Beijing, however, say the bilingual programme is expressly designed to tackle national security worries.

"All language policies in China have both an overt and covert aim. The overt side is to reinforce Chinese language, the covert is minority acculturation and assimilation," said Nicholas Bequelin, an expert on China's Muslims at Human Rights Watch.

Leaders publicly dismiss Uighur and other minority languages as backward, justifying their exclusion with arguments that range from patronising to racist, he added.

Sure, people are justified in being suspicious, and I can't say whether or not Beijing's motives here are nefarious. I'm also not saying that people shouldn't speak whatever language they care to, preserving their culture in the deal. One thing is clear, though: if you're living in a nation where 97% of the people are Han Chinese - and I am - it's a big disadvantage not to speak their language.

The photo above was taken at a schoolhouse in the village of Subash, Xinjiang. It's one of the ethnically Kygyz village "beside the mountainous highway to Pakistan" mentioned in the article below. You may also remember my declaration that it is, in my opinion, the most beautiful place in Xinjiang.

You can read the full article below.

China's ethnic minority kids caught in language trap
By Emma Graham-Harrison
6 December 2006
Reuters News

BULUNKOU, China, Dec 6 (Reuters) - Wearing an NBA sweatshirt and a Mickey Mouse cap, 13-year-old Mingbayi Abdubaki plays beside the mountainous highway to Pakistan with a battery-powered earth digger he built himself from scrap.

The Chinese teenager hopes to design real machines when he grows up, but if you believe his headmaster, he cannot understand a word of classes at his state-funded school.

Ethnically Kyrgyz, he speaks barely enough Chinese to stammer out his name and age. But under a campaign to make the language of Beijing the language of education nationwide, he is supposed to be studying only in Mandarin.

Officials say the change aims to give minority kids chances in a country dominated by Han Chinese and their language, but critics counter that it undermines their cultural identity.

And some children, caught between two languages at home and school, risk being educated properly in neither.

Headmaster Baierdibayi, who uses only one name and speaks heavily accented, broken Chinese, is in charge of around 460 students at the school in the stark but spectacular mountains that link China's northwestern Xinjiang region to central Asia.

"Our classes are taught in Mandarin," he said, under the watchful eye of an official, before conceding that some struggle.

"It is a little difficult for the children. The teachers are all Kyrgyz and can use that language if they need."

Privately, fellow villagers say most classes are taught in Kyrgyz, the shared native language of instructors and students.

But as Beijing pushes to bring more Han Chinese teachers to Xinjiang -- where it fears agitation by members of the largest minority group, the Uighurs, for a separate state -- that is true for fewer and fewer ethnic-minority schools.

"Before 2002 we only had separate schools for minorities, but in 7 or 8 years it will all be in Chinese apart from a few hours a week of their own culture," said Dilixiati, a senior official in the Kyrgyz autonomous prefecture that includes Bulunkou.

DROPOUTS?

Abdubaki's father and mother are barely literate herders so the fact that he even attends school is impressive.

But education experts warn that an abrupt shift to a new language risks leaving the most vulnerable students behind.

"If they haven't been exposed to Chinese language before they start at school, they are in a disadvantaged position," said Kate Wedgwood, China country director at Save the Children, which works to improve bilingual education in several minority areas.

"They struggle to keep up in all the subjects because they are being taught in a second language, so there is an increased chance of failure and of the children dropping out."

Studies show children probably need at least four years of education in their mother tongue to succeed at school, she said.

But ethnic tensions have made the language of education a politically charged issue, complicating her efforts to promote the use of Chinese only as a second language initially.

"What we try to do is to get governments to appreciate that this is not a threat to national unity -- children everywhere learn best in their mother tongue," Wedgwood added.

Critics of Beijing, however, say the bilingual programme is expressly designed to tackle national security worries.

"All language policies in China have both an overt and covert aim. The overt side is to reinforce Chinese language, the covert is minority acculturation and assimilation," said Nicholas Bequelin, an expert on China's Muslims at Human Rights Watch.

Leaders publicly dismiss Uighur and other minority languages as backward, justifying their exclusion with arguments that range from patronising to racist, he added.

Discrimination takes root early. At a leading middle school, touted as a showcase of ethnic unity but where barely 10 percent of students seen by journalists were non-Han, a Han Chinese teenager shrugged off the lack of different faces.

"This is a top school, so the ethnic minorities find it hard to get the marks to get a place," he said.

CULTURE OR FUTURE?

Many non-Han parents, while keen to send their children to Chinese-language schools, also resent what they see as a painful choice between an economic future and cultural traditions.

Wolfing down roast mutton in a dimly lit restaurant in the remote desert oasis of Hotan, a successful businessman who asks to be known only as Ali says that he has sent one of his two daughters to a Uighur-language school and one to a Mandarin one.

"I would prefer them both to study our language, to stay in touch with their culture, but without Chinese you have no future," he said with a mournful shrug.

"I hope this way each can make up for what the other lacks."

But even those parents who sacrifice their children's cultural links for a chance of a richer future may find that a shared language does not mean shared opportunities.

"Some of the most vocal people complaining about Chinese rule in Xinjiang are precisely the people who are educated and have Chinese skills but cannot get jobs," Bequelin said.

"A more profound problem is institutionalised discrimination. The fact that many don't speak good Chinese is just a convenient way to explain why they have an inferior position in society."

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posted December 08, 2006 at 09:10 AM unofficial Xinjiang time | Comments (46)

December 07, 2006

Whose Internet is Better?

Wangtong good, Dianxin bad.

Or, perhaps I should call this entry "Wangtong good, Dianxin bad" (网通好, 电信不好). I've just made the switch from China Telecom's super-crappy ADSL service to CNC's much better ADSL service. The difference is this: foreign website work again! All of the problems I've been having over the past few months, from YouTube videos not loading to lost Gmail connections are finally cured. The New York Times loads in a flash... my super-secret SSH tunnel works at a decent speed again. I don't know if the difference in service quality applies only to Xinjiang or to other parts of China as well. All I can say is, Hallelujah!

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posted December 07, 2006 at 02:33 PM unofficial Xinjiang time | Comments (15)

December 04, 2006

Uyghur MTV: Rock the Kashgar!

I won't write much, as China Telecom's internet service is likely to conk out on me at any moment. I finally managed to get this video uploaded last night, after waiting for something like 5 hours. We managed to get a China Telecom technician over to the house today to check out the problem... Chinese sites are loading very quickly, but foreign sites have slowed down more and more each day to what is now a snail's pace. Hrmmm. Isn't it a strange coincidence that only foreign sites are suffering? The technician said that our problem can only be dealt with by higher authorities in Beijing. (Meaning: we're f$#@ed.)

Anyway, despite my personal troubles I hope you'll enjoy this selection. The song is called "Gulzarangza" by a wonderful singer from Kashgar named Arzigul Tursun. The video is a perfect re-creation of a dream I have... something involving a happy harem of dancing Uyghur beauties, more or less. Arzigul is the one wearing a black cap and strumming a long dutar (2-stringed guitar), shown singing only briefly:


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posted December 04, 2006 at 03:34 PM unofficial Xinjiang time | Comments (35)